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This study sets out to assess the link between land leasing behavior and 
productivity differentials between male and female-headed households. A double-
moral hazard model allows us to show that landlord’s tenure insecurity leads to sub-
optimal level of effort on tenant’s part, via its impact on the likelihood of contract 
renewal. The landlord’s enforcement ability is also shown to increase the optimal 
level of effort. The empirical findings support the hypothesis that female heads of 
households have higher tenant turnover and lower enforcement ability. The results, 
however, show that contract renewal is not strongly linked to productivity.  
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1. Introduction 
As much as economic growth is crucial to the development process, it is less 
obvious whether economic growth essentially contributes to reduction of poverty by 
reaching the vulnerable sects of the population. Contrary to the “trickle-down” 
hypothesis which asserts that overall growth in the economy will eventually sink to 
the poor, many contend that the “growth processes” typically “trickle up” to the very 
rich (Todaro, 1997).  Even when growth entails a positive cascade, increasing the well 
being o f the vulnerable calls for increasing the quality of growth by ensuring that they 
appropriate a reasonable proportion of its proceeds (North, 2002).  Empowering 
vulnerable groups could also further enhance growth as it would warrant their better 
and effective participation in the development process. Thus, identifying the 
constraints they face would steer policy actions intended to empower the poor and the 
vulnerable. 
This study focuses on female heads
1 that comprise a significant proportion of 
vulnerable household classes in poor rural communities of the developing world. A 
number of studies have noted systematic downward bias in the productivity of female 
owned plots (e.g. Holden et al., 2001; Hagos, 2003; Tikabo and Holden, 2003). Such 
results persist irrespective of attempts to control for differences in labor endowment 
and heterogeneities in land quality. Even within the same household, empirical 
evidence from Burkina Faso (Udry, 1996) shows that plots controlled by women are 
farmed much less intensively than similar plots within the household controlled by 
men. 
 
                                                   
1 In Ethiopia, where the data employed in the empirical analysis of the paper is collected from, 
female household heads comprise the poorest part of the population.  Many of them are widows, 
separated or women who live on their own making a living out of selling liquor. They are 
characterized as the most resource poor, having a small amount of land, no pair of oxen, no full 
farm equipment, insufficent adult labour and little working capital. Table 1 presents a comparision 
of socioeconomic and asset characteristics of male and female households.   3 
Lack of assets (including draught power) as well as labour shortage
2 , 
characterize female-headed households.  
Under conditions where factor markets are working perfectly, female 
households would be able to hire in labor, oxen or rent out land until factor ratios are 
equalized across all households and potential productivity differentials are dissipated. 
However, markets for the complementary n on-land factors are characterized by 
notorious imperfections (Bliss and Stern, 1982; Holden et al. 2003) which makes 
female households heavily reliant on renting out land for production.  
On the other hand,  the extent to which land markets contribute to 
equalization of factor ratios across households depends o n the transactions costs 
households face in the land market itself. The main objective of the paper is to seek 
explanation to productivity differentials between male and female households in terms 
of differences in land leasing behavior. Particularly, we plan to test the impacts of 
differences in tenure insecurity, contract length and enforcement ability on 
productivity.  
In societies where the main agricultural activities are undertaken only by 
men, there are tendencies to disregard the role of women as farmers (Mutimba and 
Bekele, 2000). This might lead to an undermining of women’s position as landlords 
inducing systematically higher tenure insecurity on their part. In giving out the land 
for lease, female heads might opt for shorter term rental contracts and might also be 
reluctant to rent out their land. This is because female heads would fear that tenants 
might establish claims towards their land if the same tenant continues to stay on the 
land for long. In line with this, Bellemare and Barrett (2003) argue that when 
choosing the terms of contract, the landlord considers the impact of her choice on the 
probability that she will retain future rights to the rented land. On the tenant’s part, 
                                                   
2  This is true for Ethiopia where there is a taboo against women doing certain farming operations like 
ploughing with oxen.   4 
expectations of being evicted from the (rented) land would curb the incentive towards 
exerting otherwise higher level of effort. 
In addition, female  landlords might need to exert extra monitoring and 
supervision to ensure that optimal level of tenant effort is exerted. This is because 
during peak labour and oxen seasons (days), the tenant will be labour constrained and 
meeting the labour requirements of both his and the landlord’s land will be straining. 
Thus, bargaining power becomes very critical in ensuring optimal level of effort. As a 
result, they might resort to other suboptimal labor arrangements that would lead to 
lower land productivity.   
In sum, the study hypothesizes the following: heterogeneities with respect to 
tenure security would lead to shorter duration of contracts and lower productivity on 
land rented in from female  landlords than from the male landlords. On the other hand 
insecurity of tenure of female headed households and their inability to enforce the 
terms of the contract may lead them to suboptimal owner cultivation due to their 
hesitation to rent out their land, leading to lower land productivity on owner operated 
plots of female headed households than on owner operated plots of male headed 
households.  
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we give the theoretical 
background of the paper. Section 3 details the data employed in the empirical 
analysis. Estimation methodology along with some considerations in the estimation 
procedure is provided in section 4. Section 5 presents the empirical findings. Section 6 
concludes.  
2. The Model  
Our main premise is that female landlords are tenure insecure and face higher 
transaction costs in the land lease market.  Their tenure insecurity and high level of 
transaction cost could lead them to behave differently from their male counter parts in   5 
terms of contract renewal. This will have differential effect on the tenant’s effort, who 
would tailor his effort according to his expectation of contract renewal. Differential 
tenant effort that is caused by differential contract renewal would lead to observed 
productivity differential between plots that are owned by male and female headed 
households. 
Given this, the essence of the model is to assess the link between landlord ’s 
tenure insecurity and transaction costs faced in the land lease market to contract 
renewal and tenant’s optimal level of effort.  As any other transaction, land 
transactions could be effected for shorter or longer durations3. When search processes 
are costless and the landlord  is fully secure about his (her)  landownership, shorter 
duration contracts are as good as the longer duration ones in terms of search cost. 
With positive search costs and full tenure security, however, longer term contracting 
would be more attractive as it reduces search costs for both parties. Thus the landlord 
would be expected to offer longer duration contract and the tenant to work harder not 
to be evicted from the land. On the other hand, if the landlord  is less than fully tenure-
secure, longer term contracting could induce the risk of losing land to the tenant. 
Thus, to the landlord, deciding on the duration of the contract involves weighing the 
benefit of reduced search cost against the risk of losing the land to the tenant. The 
tenant who enters into a contract with a tenure insecure landlord also considers the 
chance of being evicted from the (rented) land in exerting effort. 
We consider a contract by a  landlord and a tenant that stipulates output 
sharing conditions from rented out land. Contracts are also typically entered for one 
production year. However, the tenant’s effort, which is not observable to the landlord 
will not be stipulated in the contract. Similarly, contracts are entered for one year with 
a possibility of renewal. However, whether a contract will be renewed or not will not 
                                                   
3 In this context, short duration contracts refer to one-year (one production season) agreements, while 
longer duration contracts involve arrangements longer than one year.   6 
be specified in the contract. The situation leads to a double moral hazard problem 
where the  landlord’s decision to renew the contract is not observed by the tenant and 
the tenant’s choice of optimal level of effort is not observed by the landlord.  
 
Landlord’s problem: 
We c onsider the  landlord’s standard expected utility function from 
production profit with positive search cost and augmented to allow for the risk of 
losing the land due to longer term rentals
4.  The landlord’s profit function is composed 
of the total revenue from agricultural production and the cost of search for a tenant. 
The revenue is represented by  the function,  q f , where q  is a positive random 
variable with an expected value of unity, intended to embody the effects of 
uncertainty in the agricultural production (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1985), and  f  is an 
increasing function of effort. The cost of time and resources the  landlord spends 
searching for the tenant is given by c. a represents the share of the total output that 
goes to the tenant
5.  
 
Given this, at each period, the  landlord will have the option of: 1) incurring a search 
cost and getting a new tenant without running into the risk of losing land, and 2) renewing the 
contract to the same tenant. Therefore, the landlord incurs no cost but carries the risk of losing 
the land to the tenant. At each period, the profit from the option of searching for a tenant and 
getting production is given by:  
(1)(()()) R fekec paq =---         (1) 
On the other hand, the profit from the option of renewing the contract with the same tenant is 
given by:  
(1)(()()) A Gfeke paq =--         (2) 
                                                   
4 We have assumed that a fixed amount of land is to be rented out and the risk of losing land is 
associated exclusively to contract renewals.  
5 Fixed rentals are very few in the data, thus we have assumed away linear contracting.    7 
Under this condition, the  landlord would not incur any search cost. However, the  landlord 
faces the risk that the tenant attempts to expropriate land and may stop paying the share to the 
landlord. The expected probability that he expropriates the land is (1-G). Therefore, the 
probability of retaining rented out land is G. It should be noted that G is not a constant 
probability over time but rather a survival rate whose value reduces over time. The intuitive 
reason for its fall over time is because the longer the duration of the contract, the more likely 
expropriation is to be successful.   
Let W be discounted present value of expected utility for a landlord who is deciding to renew 
a contract or not at every given period
















              (3) 
Where the maximization is over two actions: terminate the current contract and engage in 
searching for a new tenant. We assume there exists a switch point where the two 
expressions are equal to each other. Since the  landlord only observes output, but not 
effort, we solve for the threshold level of expected output that makes the landlord renew 
the contract. 
[ ] [ ] (1)(()())(1)(()()) EUfekecEUGfeke aqaq ---=--     (4) 
Since the landlord only observes output and not effort, we set  (()) fehQ = q . In addition, 
since the utility functions are the same, equation (4) could be solved for by equating the 
arguments inside the utility functions, which are the same
7.  
(1)(1) QcGQ --=- aa         (5) 
The solution to the above equation becomes  
                                                   
 
7 For a risk averse land owner, we can take a logarithmic utility function (following Bellemare and 
Barrett (2004), for instance).  The expression transforms into:  
[ ] [ ] ln(1)(()())ln(1)(()()) fekecGfeke aqaq ---=-- , exponentiating this will transform 















    (6) 
Thus the  landlord  would renew the contract if the realized output is at least  * Q . 
Otherwise, the landlord would terminate the contract.  
 
The relationship between the probability of retaining the land is given by the following 
equation where  G corresponds to the  landlord’s probability of retaining the land which 











       (7) 
Thus, from the  landlord’s problem we can see that higher G increases the threshold  * Q .  







, a higher  * Q  (due to lower  G) , 
increases the likelihood of h being zero. 
TESTABLE IMPLICATION 1:  lower tenure security leads to lower probability of 
contract renewal. 
Categorizing households based on the gender of the head, we can have the following 
relationship between gender and  G, the probability that the  landlord still keeps the 
ownership of the land after renting out
8. G=G(g), where g stands for gender (g=1 for 
female and  g=0 for male headed households). Given our premise that female headed 
households are tenure insecure, G (g=1) will be lower than G(g=0). 
 









, for female headed households    (8) 
And  
                                                   









 for male headed households     (9) 
 
Given that  G (g=1) < G(g=0), the expression in  (8) will be greater than the expression in 
(9).   







, this implies that  h=0 for higher range of 
Q*  for female headed households. Graphically,  
 This implies that female headed households, who are supposed to be less tenure secure 
are less likely to renew contracts with the same tenant. In other words, female (tenure 
insecure) households would require higher compensation to renew the contract.  
TESTABLE IMPLICATION 2: Female headed households, who are supposedly tenure 
insecure are less likely to renew contracts with the same tenant than their male 
counterparts.  
 
The relationship between the threshold  * Q  and the cost of search is given by: 
h 
1 h =  
0 h=  
*
0 g Q =  
*
1 g Q =  









TESTABLE IMPLICATION 3:  higher search cost leads to higher probability of 
contract renewal. 
Tenant’s problem:  
  Although the  landlord observes his /her decision to renew the contract,  h, to the  
tenant,  h is observed only as a probability P. Thus, at every period, the tenant could 
get a renewal with a probability  P and a t ermination a probability (1-P). Upon 
termination, the tenant would have to incur a search cost 
T c  to find another land with 
the same quality, thus identical production function.  
Upon renewal, the tenant has two options: to cultivate the land when the land is in the 
landlord’s hand, with probability G and to expropriate the land from the landlord  with 
probability 1-G.  
If the tenant expropriates the land, he will get an income of 
_
S . However, the act of 
expropriation is not costless and thus the tenant will incur  E C  as the cost of 
expropriation.  
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Which, with rearrangement will be : 
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    (14) 
Interpretation: 
1.   The last two terms in the expression, () ee fk aq - give  the standard conditions for 
determining the optimal level of effort under linear contracting (sharecropping).  




eE PGSCC Øø --- Œœ ºß
, gives the extra effort term due to 
contract renewal.  
3.   The first term  (1)()() eee GPfekefk aqaq Øø --+- ºß  is  what stands for the 
tenure insecurity effect and is non-positive because the maximum value G can 
attain is one. The term captures the disincentive to the tenant’s effort from the 
landlord’s tenure insecurity. The lower the G value (more tenure insecurity), the 
more negative the first term becomes. When G is one, the term disappears 
showing that there will not be a disincentive effect to the tenant once the landlord 
is fully tenure secure. 
 
                                                   




 disappears from the expression.   12 
TESTABLE IMPLICATION 4:  the likelihood of contract renewal has a positive 
impact on productivity. 
 
TESTABLE IMPLICATION 5: the landlord’s tenure insecurity (and its interaction 
with the likelihood of contract renewal) has negative impact on productivity. The 
results are in line with the model and empirical findings of Kassie and Ho lden 
(2005) in Western Gojjam, Ethiopia.  
 
Like the landlord’s case, we compare the optimal levels of effort where G (g=1) 
will be lower than  G(g=0). Based on equation (14), the condition for optimal effort 
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  In order to compare optimal levels of tenant’s effort for land owned by male and 
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¶¶ Øø =-==--+--- Œœ ¶¶ ºß (18)   13 
Since expression (18) is always negative, this implies that the optimal level of 
tenant’s effort is lower on female owned plots than male owned plots.  
TESTABLE IMPLICATION 6:  Due to  tenure insecurity (and its interaction with 
the likelihood of contract renewal), female  plots have lower productivity than male 
plots.  
 
4. The data 
The data we use are taken from a survey of approximately 2000 households 
in two districts of the Amhara National Regional State, a region which encompasses 
part of the Northern and Central Highlands of Ethiopia. One of the Zones (Districts), 
East Gojjam is a fertile plateau receiving good average rainfall while the South Wollo 
zone is characterized by degraded hill side plots receiving lower and highly erratic 
rainfall.  
This study employs information from about 230  landlord households among 
the 2000 households included in the survey. Almost all sample landlords engaged in 
the land rental market are included in this study. An overall sample of 130 male and 
100 female landlords is included as a result.  
As has been noted in the previous section,  landlords may or may not engage 
in the land lease market, by virtue of which they are categorized as ‘ autarkic’ , 
‘landlords’ or ‘tenants’. For those who engage in the land lease market, they might do 
so partially or fully i.e. by renting out all/part of the plots which belong to them. Table 
1 presents nature and extent of participation in the land lease market by gender 
category. 
The participation of female headed households in the land market is 
restricted to the leasing-out side of the market. Thus, for our purpose,  landlord 
households (both male and female) are the relevant groups and our analysis is   14 
restricted to male and female  landlords who engage in the land lease market as 
landlords. While there are some households who lease out their land fully, a 
considerable proportion of them are owner-cum  landlords who have some of their 
plots under their management.  This would also give us the possibility to control for 
the leasing effect and analyse the impact of tenure insecurity on the decision to lease.  
Table 2 presents the summary statistics and definition of the variables used in 
the regressions.  
4. Empirical Methodology and Estimation Considerations 
The aim of this section is to set up a framework for analyzing the relationship 
between land leasing behavior and its impact on the productivity of male and female 
owned plots. We intend to establish econometric relationships that would enable us 
empirically investigate the existence of significant productivity differences among 
male and female household heads. We also attempt to investigate if a significant 
proportion of the differences are attributable to differences in the working of the land 
market. To this effect, we study the relationships between three sets of factors. We 
start with specifying the relationships between gender of the household head and 
productivity. We then set the econometric relationships between contract duration and 
its determinants. Finally, we add contract renewal in the productivity regression. 
4.1. The existence of gender-based productivity differentials 
As per the standard productivity analysis, plot-level productivity is 
determined by plot characteristics and household level characteristics. In addition, 
because some plots are traded, trade status is included as an additional determinant of 
productivity. Accordingly, the econometric relationship is specified as:  
 
ip ipiipip ySXTu awpz =++++   (19)   15 
 
Where for household i and plot p,  
ip y  is the value of output per ha 
i S represents socio-economic characteristics including gender 
ip X  is physical farm characteristics of the plot 
ip T  is the plot’s trade status  
a,  w  p  and z are the respective coefficients to be estimated; and  
ip u  is an error term 
Up to this point, we have ruled out the possibility that heterogeneities exist 
with respect to land leasing behaviour. In other words, equation (1) implicitly assumes 
that the choice to lease is a decision set by exogenous set of factors with no bearing on 
productivity. As argued in Section 2, however, differences in underlying tenure 
insecurity would lead to differences in the renewal of contracts.  Sections 4.2 and 4.3 
introduce h eterogeneous tenure securities between households and assess the 
subsequent impact on productivity.    
4.2. Contract Renewal 
The degree of insecurity a potential landlord has towards his/her land could 
affect land leasing behaviour.  A tenure insecure  landlord  might have fear of losing 
the land to the tenant if the tenant stays on the same land for long.  This could lead to 
reluctance to renew contracts. Thus, if as we argue, female landlord s are less tenure 
secure, being a female will be a negative determinant of contract  renewal.  The 
econometric problem is represented by a bivariate probit model with sample selection. 
The estimation procedure  involves two stages where in the first stage, a  possible 
sample selection is addressed by estimating a selection equation for  traded  versus 
non-traded  plots.  In the second stage, a survival equation is estimated where the   16 
dependent variable is contract renewal or not for the second stage. Plot characteristics 
are used in the first stage for determination of traded plots while these variables are 
excluded in the second stage where contract renewal is the decision. Accordingly, the 
selection equation is given by: 














Where  i P is an indicator variable equal to 1 if  plot is traded, i S  is a vector of socio-
economic characteristics,  i X  is a vector of physical  farm characteristics and  i u  is an 
error term. 
The survival equation is given by  
*
p ipipiipiipi RXSEClClGv fyphmm =++++++                             (21) 
Where  i S represents socio-economic characteristics including gender 
ip X  is physical farm characteristics of the plot 
ip Cl is the number of years the tenant has managed plot p of household i ; 
ip E is a set of variables measuring the enforcement ability of the landlord;  
i T  is the underlying tenure security variables  
* ip ClGis the interaction between gender and contract renewal  
ip R  is a dichotomous variable indicating whether contract will be renewed or 
not for the next production year.  
4.3. Land leasing behaviour and productivity 
Considering heterogeneous land leasing behaviour implies taking contract 
renewal as an additional determinant of productivity.     17 
Accordingly the productivity equation with contract renewal as an additional 
variable is given by :  for the non-leased plots is given by:  
ip ipiipipip ySXTR awpzv =+++++  (22) 
 
Since contract renewal is  endogenous in the above equation, OLS estimation 
would lead to biased and inconsistent estimates. Thus, we use an instrumental variable 
estimation where a predicted value of the contract renewal is used in estimating 
equation (22).  
In order to construct the instrument for contract renewal, we formed groups 
of households by Kebele. With 12 kebeles in our sample, we ended up with 12 groups 
of households. The average contract renewal of al l households within a group other 
than that of the household itself is calculated for each household to form the 
instrument for contract renewal.  
Inorder to obtain the predicted value of contract renewal, we use the 
instrument and other determinants of contract renewal in the bivariate probit with 
selection  framework. 
 
5. Results 
This section presents the empirical results from estimation of the 
productivity, contract renewal and extended_ productivity equations, respectively. 
5.1. The effect of gender on productivity 
Table 4 presents the treatment-effects model estimation results for the pooled 
traded and non traded plots. The treatment variable is the trade status of a given plot 
while the effect variable is productivity.  The coefficient for trade on the productivity 
equation is positive and significant indicating that there is a positive gain from trade,   18 
holding other factors constant. On the other hand, female plots which are more likely 
to be traded than male owned plots, remain far less productive (see the shares of 
traded plots by gender on Table 1). This points to the possibility that female and male 
households do not benefit from land leasing equally. 
In addition, farm size is a negative determinant of productivity indicating that 
our results support the inverse farm size-productivity relationship and its land market 
imperfection implication. Plot slope and plot fertility are negative and positive 
determinants of productivity respectively. The level of education and trainings 
attended exhibit no significant contributions. Fertilizer significantly and positively 
contributes to productivity.  
As would be expected, households with more oxen are less likely to rent out 
land. Because of labour constraints, plots owned by female household heads are more 
likely to be rented out. However, bigger land area decreases the probability of renting 
out land.   
5.2. Tenure insecurity and contract renewal  
Table 5 presents the estimation results from the survival analysis. The 
determinants of contract renewal considered include the  landlord’s & the tenant’s 
characteristics, tenure insecurity variables and enforcement ability indicators. Female 
heads are significantly less likely to continue contracts with the same tenant than male 
heads. This is in line with our hypothesis that, because of their systematically lower 
tenure security, female heads would be reluctant to renew contracts with the same 
tenant. The other socio economic characteristics of the  landlord i.e., the  landlord ’s 
age, level of education and the number of adult family members are not significant. 
Of the tenant characteristics included, the number of oxen the tenant has is not a 
significant determinant of contract renewal which implies that because of oxen market   19 
imperfections, tenants with many oxen might take contracts with too many  landlords 
which might in turn impact on their productivity. Older tenants are less likely to get 
their contracts renewed. 
 
Of the tenure security variables, the landlord’s experience of land gain or loss 
and expectations of future changes in the land size are significant and negative 
determinants of contract renewal. However, expectation of future land redistribution 
is insignificant.  
Contracts are less likely to be continued between male heads and blood 
related tenants. The effect is insignificant for female headed households. On the other 
hand, female landlords are likely to renew contracts with tenants who have blood 
relationship with the spouse (dead husband for instance). Under this particular case, 
coercion might be involved where female households are forcefully entering into and 
extending contracts to blood and spousal relations
10. In addition, inability to monitor 
the tenant and satisfaction with the overall performance of the tenant are not 
significant. However, for female  landlords the inability to monitor the tenant and 
satisfaction with the overall performance of the tenant  are positive and significant 
indicating that coercion might be involved in some arrangements.  
5.3. The determinants of productivity -extended 
Table 7 presents the ordinary least squares estimation for the determinants of 
productivity. Owing to possible heterogeneity in land leasing behaviour and its impact 
on productivity, we include contract renewal as an additional determinant. Since 
contract renewal is likely to be endogenous, we used the predicted contract renewal in 
                                                   
10 This was revealed to us upon our discussion with some of the female respondents who mentioned 
that they enter into contracts with the relatives to the husband who believe that the land belongs to their 
brother (the woman’s husband).    20 
the regression
11.  The predicted value of contract renewal is obtained using estimates 
presented in table 6.  
Compared to the productivity regression results in Table 4, many of the 
coefficients in this regression regime are insignificant. Particularly, the gender 
dummy and predicted contract renewal is insignificant.  
Tenure insecurity, particularly, experience of change in landholdings is 
significant. Among the physical plot characteristics, steep-slope and infertile plots are 
significant negative determinants of productivity.  Other socio-economic 
characteristics like age of the household are insignificant. However education of the 
household head is negative and significant. This could be the effect of landlords who 




Does gender discrimination have an impact on earnings and economic 
performances? This question has been widely examined in labor market studies where 
possibilities for differential wage payment exist. The paper assesses the possibility of 
discrimination against women and its impact on their productivity in a poor small 
farm setting where women are factor owners and employers.  
Because the main agricultural activities are undertaken by men, in such 
settings, there are tendencies to disregard the role of women as farmers. This might 
lead to undermining their landlord ship and weakening their bargaining positions in the 
land lease market.   
The double moral hazard model of a landlord  and a tenant allowed us to 
show the importance of landlord’s tenure (in)security in determination of the optimal 
                                                   
11 Contract renewal is for the coming production year while productivity is for the current production 
year.     21 
current level of tenant’s effort.  Through probability of contract renewal as a factor 
linking  landlord ’s expected search cost and tenant’s effort, the underlying tenure 
security term is found to be positively related to tenant’s effort. The finding is in line 
with our hypothesis that female heads that feel more tenure insecure are able to 
command less effort from the tenant.  The model also showed that landlord’s ability to 
enforce the terms of the contract as depicted by the tenant’s reputational 
considerations has a positive impact on the optimal level of effort.  
The empirical analysis started out by establishing that female owned plots 
exhibit significantly lower productivity. This is in line with the findings by other 
studies. Contract renewal, one link via which tenure insecurity leads to suboptimal 
level of effort, is found to  be lower for female owned plots. Moreover, tenure 
insecurity is shown to have a lowering impact on contract renewal. 
However, the relationship between productivity and contract renewal, was 
found not to be strong.  
Given the long history of women’s lack of property rights over their land, an 
important policy progress has been made by formally entitling them to land rights. 
One important implication of our result is that a full step forward with respect to 
empowering rural women in land rights requires their proper recognition as farmers 
which would enable them feel more tenure secure and have better bargaining power in 
the land lease market. At a more general level, this indicates that ensuring that 
informal grounds are levelled is important for obtaining expected results from a policy 
change. 
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Table 1: Socioeconomic and endowment characteristics by the gender of the household head.  
  Socioeconomic characteristics   




Oxen   Livestock 
(tlu) 
























   Tenure security indicators 
  conflict  certificate  security  addition  loss  belong 
























  Land market participation 














0  0.62 
(0.48) 
0  0.07 
(0.08) 
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Table 2: DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES Used in the regressions 
Variables  Description 
LANDLORD 
CHARACTERISTICS 






























Head’s formal education (1=read and write; 2= read only; 3=none) 
Age of household head? 
The number of working-age family member of the landlord 
Gender of the household head 
Zone the household belongs in  
Total farm area (ha) 
Amount of fertilizer applied (kg) 
Amount of manure applied (kg) 
steep slope of the plot 
medium slope of the plot 
fertile plot  
medium fertile plot 
merere (good soil water holding capacity) plot 
 
Tenant’s age 
The number of oxen owned by the tenant 
 
A dummy variable standing for whether the tenant is a blood relation or not (1=blood relation, 0=no) 
A dummy variable standing for whether the tenant is an in-law or not 
Whether the tenant is a blood relation given that the  landlord is female 
Whether the tenant is an in-law given that the  landlord is female 
Whether the landlord is satisfied with the performance of the tenant (1=satisfied, 0=otherwise) 
 
Whether the landlord is satisfied with the performance of the tenant given that the  landlord is female 
Whether the landlord is unable to monitor the activities of the tenant (1=unable to monitor, 0=otherwise) 
Whether the landlord is unable to monitor the activities of the tenant and the  landlord is female 
The number of years the particular plot has been managed by the current tenant 















Contract renewal   
Trade 




Whether the landlord expects increase, no change or decrease in the land size in 
 the coming five years (1=decrease 2=no change 3=increase) 
Whether the landlord has experienced change in the  landlordship in the last 
Five years  (1=change, 0=no change) 
Whether the landlord has experienced any conflict regarding the land 
 
 
The value of production per ha.  
The trade status of the plot (1= traded, 0=owner-operated?) 
The type of rental arrangement the land is under: fixed rent, sharecropping with premium, sharecropping 
and cost sharing (codes used??)   27 
Table 3: Summary statistics of  variables used in the regressions 
 
Dependent Variable 
                     Mean      Std. Dev.      Min        Max 
0utput Val./ha |   1629.588     2627.678  91.58787   41729.07 
      Renewal      .7118476    .2882522  0           1     
      trade |      .5998623    .4000948          0           1  
     
Landlord’s socio economic characteristics  
        
      female |      .3700348     .482982          0          1 
       hage1 |      57.10732    17.27825         13         95 
      heduc1 |      1.533101    .8520947          1          3 
     adultfs |      3.525436     1.69498          1          9 
       
 
Landlord’s physical farm characteristics  and plot level input application  
      
      slope1 |      .0224079    .1480341          0          1 
      slope2 |      .3653627    .4816232          0          1 
  fertility1 |      .3159894     .464997          0          1 
  fertility2 |      .4379035    .4962233          0          1 
   soiltype1 |      .2650968    .4414686          0          1 
        area |      1.476343    .9648846          0    4.52025 
      manure |      31.58342    114.4419          0       1140 
  fertilizer |      13.68792    156.4746          0       5000 
Tenant’s socio economic characteristics 
         
        oxcd |      1.894108    1.107422          0          8 
       agecd |      24.60692    27.32757          10         91 
 
Tenure security variables 
 
     changeland |      .1725125    .3779606          0          1 
       security |      2.508232    .9587313          1          4 
       conflict |      .198282    .3988485           0          1 
 
 
Enforcement and contract Variables 
 
      clength  |       4.467254    3.537878         1         20 
 female*clength        2.367704    4.054094      0    20 
     instrument  .73782    .2277116  .1473684  .9767442 
        better |      .5895465    .8470845          0          2 
      hardwork |      .4347202    .6566024          0          3 
       tenantb |      .3902611     .487981          0          1 
       stenant |      .0769231    .2665634          0          1 
          kinf |      .8678414    .7790105          0          2    28 
Table 4: Treatment-Effect estimates of Pooled Plot-level determinants of productivity 
Productivity Equation  Plot’s trade status selection equation 
female  -639.995 
  (143.513)*** 
hage1  1.684 
  (3.914) 
heduc1  -73.616 
  (80.269) 
adultfs  103.235 
  (45.345)** 
Fertility1 133.378 
  (85.293) 
Fertility2 471. 041 
   596.211 
Slope1  -181.480 
  (107.699)* 
Slope2  119.598 
  (103.060) 
Soiltype1   262.432 
            213.048 
area  -270.905 
  (86.234)*** 
manure  0.330 
  (0.616) 
fertilizer 13.231 
  (3.336)*** 
trade  211.516 
  (458.287) 
Constant  1,545.407 
  (591.686)*** 
 
female  -0.033 
  (0.114) 
hage1  0.005 
  (0.003)* 
heduc1  -0.106 
  (0.056)* 
adultfs  -0.182 
  (0.042)*** 
Fertility1 -0.127 
  (0.161) 
Fertility2 -0.104 
  (0.146) 
Slope1  0.046 
  (0.078) 
Slope2  -0.144 
  (0.059)** 
Soiltype1  7.523 
  (12.024) 
area  -0.226 
  (0.054)*** 
security  -0.125 
  (0.045)*** 
confilct  0.160 
  (0.107) 
changeland 0.014 
  (0.120) 
Constant  1.566 
  (0.330)*** 
   29 
  
 
Table 5: Bivariate Probit Model with Selection Estimation Results for the   
            Likelihood of Contract Renenwal on Rented Plots.   
  Survival Equation         Plot Rent Equation  
           Contract renewal          Rented out plot         
 
security  0.070   
  (0.077)   
experience  
of change in  
land size  -1.124   
  (0.223)***  
female  -0.888      0.215 
  (0.324)***     (0.095)** 
age  0.005      0.005 
  (0.005)      (0.003)* 
education  0.155      0.102 
  (0.112)      (0.054)* 
adult  
family size-0.048      -0.152 
  (0.065)      (0.026)*** 
conflict  0.098   
  (0.196)   
btenant 
  -0.536   
  (0.215)**   
bftenant  0.661   
  (0.351)*   
stenant  -0.112   
  (0.419)   
sftenant   0.402   
  (0.546)   
tagecd  -0.332   
  (0.094)***  
toxcd  0.073   
  (0.067)   
inability  0.118   
  (0.336)   
finability-1.508   
  (0.545)***  
satisfied  1.127   
  (0.234)***  
Fsatisfied  0.366   
  (0.319)   
hl  0.042   
  (0.049)   
clength  0.023   
  (0.034)   
slope1        0.431 
        (0.212)** 
slope2        -0.271 
        (0.101)*** 
fertility1       0.138 
        (0.127) 
fertility2       0.089 
        (0.090) 
soiltype1        0.587 
        (0.282)** 
Constant  1.108      0.154   30 
  (0.549)**      (0.240) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses     
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     31 
Table  6 : Bivariate Probit Model with Selection Estimation Results for the   
            Likelihood of Contract Renenwal on Rented Plots. 
   
  Survival Equation         Plot Rent Equation  
        
           Contract renewal          Rented out plot         
instrumen  1.453   
  (0.447)***  
security  0.057   
  (0.079)   
changeland -1.090   
  (0.218)***  
hsex  -0.693      0.214 
  (0.341)**      (0.095)** 
hage1  0.007      0.005 
  (0.005)      (0.003)* 
heduc1  0.188      0.104 
  (0.116)      (0.054)* 
adultfs  -0.054      -0.152 
  (0.065)      (0.026)*** 
confilct  0.078   
  (0.203)   
btenant  -0.537   
  (0.217)**   
fbtenant  0.510   
  (0.354)   
stenant  -0.087   
  (0.448)   
sftenant  0.235   
  (0.576)   
tage  -0.353   
  (0.097)***  
toxcd  0.067   
  (0.067)   
inability  0.212   
  (0.359)   
finability -1.543   
  (0.554)***  
satisfied  1.184   
  (0.232)***  
fsatisfied 0.248   
  (0.331)   
hl  0.042   
  (0.050)   
clength1  0.023   
  (0.035)   
slope1        0.431 
        (0.213)** 
slope2        -0.271 
        (0.101)*** 
fertilit1        0.147 
        (0.126) 
fertilit2        0.090 
        (0.090) 
soiltype1        0.580 
        (0.283)** 
Constant  -0.150      0.146 
  (0.718)      (0.240) 
Standard errors in parentheses     
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   32 
Table 7: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of Household Level 
Determinants of Productivity 
   
  Value of output per hectare 
 
Contract  -48.107  
Renewal    (84.647) 
(predicted) 
 
security  -34.050 
  (43.624) 
experience  
of change in  
land size  -718.158 
  (85.798)*** 
female  -104.808 
  (96.595) 
age  -1.309 
  (2.273) 
education  -123.720 
  (43.127)*** 
adult 
family size 42.171 
  (26.231) 
slope1  162.231 
  (183.983) 
slope2  358.656 
  (101.833)*** 
fertility1 126.419 
  (124.087) 
fertility2 -189.266 
  (71.797)*** 
soiltype1  -392.578 
  (259.905) 
conflict  187.318 
  (109.364)* 
Constant  1,668.330 
  (258.016)*** 
Observations  1687 
R-squared  0.10 
Standard errors in parentheses   
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
   
 